THE ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY CAMPAIGN
FOREWORD
In 1984 we co-founded the Advocacy Institute as a non-profit, tax exempt center for the study, analysis , and teaching of advocacy strategies and skills, for use by citizens and their voluntary organizations to effect public policy change. The Institute works with the public interest community by researching and teaching legislative and media advocacy skills; providing tactical counseling for specific problems in a large number of public policy areas; conducting workshops and seminars to "connect" advocates working in different issue areas to share knowledge and experience; and training and nurturing emerging issue leaders.
As we have taught, we have also learned. we have learned from the creative tactics and strategies adopted by our fellow advocates, and we have captured many of the, so that others may learn from those experiences. Too often lessons learned in the heat of one advocacy battle are not recorded and transmitted to the next generation of advocates. This guide is a modest attempt to rectify that problem. It analyzes the constituent parts of an advocacy campaign, and explains how a successful campaign knits those parts together into an effective, integrated whole.
This guide's structure reflects our preferred teaching method; although each section begins with a distillation of principals, it relies heavily on examples drawn from a dozen public interest campaigns, on issue ranging from arms control to energy efficiency to smoking and health. We draw heavily on the block Bork campaign because it illustrates so many different advocacy lessons, and is so well chronicled. We are grateful to the many public interest advocates who took the time to share their campaign histories with us, and who experiences enrich this guide and our own understanding of advocacy. We hope they will derive satisfaction, as we do, out of the knowledge that sharing these lessons will help increase the effectiveness of all advocates.
I. INTRODUCTION
If it's time for a key vote in the House of Representatives, you'll probably find public interest lobbyists "off the floor." That's the area beside the bank of elevators and the pay phone, just outside the doors into the House change, and it's where public interest lobbyists congregate at crucial moments. There, lobbyists trade information, talk with Members of Congress, check-in with their offices, and await the outcome of important votes. When the new is good, there are sure to be congratulations for the winners and condolences for the losers. When the opposition carries the day, there are likely to be new strategies for new campaigns; whatever the vote, advocates know they will be back.
That House vote was just on step, probably not the final step, in a long advocacy campaign. If that campaign is to succeed, it should have clear goals, easily articulated. The goals should express unity and values of importance to the public - justice, fairness, equity, and truth all retain untold political clout - and the issue should be framed to appeal to prevailing public opinions and beliefs. The appeal should be addressed to the widest possible group of potential constituents, no just the narrow body of existing supporters. To be successful, the appeal will have to grow by attracting increasing numbers of supporters from ever-widening circles. Coordination and collaboration are important, but so are diversity and contrast.
Campaigns require a long term vision, yet goals should be achievable. Gains may be incremental as long as that vision is not lost. At the same time, campaign strategies and tactics should be organic, adjusting to changing circumstances, constantly reassessing positions and progress in light of changing conditions and opinions.
No one - and no group - can do it alone. The care and feeding of each participant, no matter how inexperienced or humble, counts. The merits of the case count; homework counts; research and analysis are essential. Ideas matter, so do values and vision. Yet moral suasion won't succeed without the facts to back up even the best argument.
Advocacy is a long distance race, not for the short winded. Rarely are battle won or list with a single effort. Successful advocacy require organization, tolerance and patience, and enthusiasm for the tedious and mundane tasks, as well as the moments of high drama.
This guide discusses the main elements of an advocacy campaign:
§ Building and maintaining effective networks and coalitions;
§ Capturing the media's and the public's attention by creatively framing issues; Strengthening grassroots' support by providing issue leadership, coupled with constructive, two-way communication;
§ Lobbying effectively with comparatively few resources;
§ Building and sustaining the intensity and public support required to advance and issuer on the nation's agenda; and,
§ Integrating advocacy strategies and tactics into a cohesive, persuasive public policy advocacy campaign.
We begin each section of this guide with a discussion of basic principles, followed by specific suggestions for effective advocacy. Finally, we illustrate those suggestions with examples drawn from a range of public interest case studies conducted by the Advocacy Institute.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE GRASSROOTS
Every advocacy campaign ultimately depends for its success on the support of the people - the grassroots. While some popular campaigns arise directly out of grassroots passion and indignation, many more are conceived and directed centrally, often by Washington-based advocacy organizations. Today's campaigns are most often the result of research, analysis, and advocacy begun at the top of membership or advocacy organizations. Those organizations face a difficult, dual challenge. They must involve their membership - the grassroots - the formulation of the campaign and its goals, and they must mobilize them to achieve success. Organizations must first listen carefully to their supporters as they formulate policy initiatives, and second they must provide the grassroots with the necessary tools and incentives to accomplish their goals.
Individuals join together in voluntary associations for many reasons; just as a coalition being together individuals and organizations whose sole common ground is their support for the objective of the coalition, so too an organization often attracts as members individuals with diverse interests whose only meeting point is their affiliation with the organization. Each new campaign the organization undertakes requires many of the same skills needed to form and manage a coalition. There is no assurance that the members will all agree on the objectives of the next campaign, at least not without a concerted effort to educate and "bring along" one's own constituency.
Nowhere is the tension between "inside" and "outside" efforts greater than in the integration of "Washington" and the "field." Used positively, the result can be creative tension; otherwise the results may be disastrous. The labels "Washington" and "field" themselves reveal the germ of the problem; they are "we-they" terms. The professional public interest lobbyists, media strategists, and organizers based in Washington tend to view their local members and activists in the field as a resource to be cultivated and ultimately, controlled. Washington-based advocates are reluctant to leave any part of a national grassroots campaign untended; surely, they believe, there must be a coordination process controlled by a central authority if there is to be unity themes and strategies.
Grassroots activists, on the other hand, tend to view even their own colleagues and leaders in Washington as tainted by their surroundings, by the perceived arrogance of that center of power. grassroots activists feel closer to "the people," while Washington, and all who work within it, are seen as isolated from the real country. They feel Washington appreciates non of their knowledge and learning, their strategies skills, their prudence and judgment.
Yet Washington must continually turn to the grassroots, no just for guidance or validation, but for manifestations of political support. To be effective advocates, the grassroots must be more than passive supporters of policy. They must be active participants in advocacy campaigns, willing and able to demonstrate their political power.
There are two essential phases in a grassroots campaign - mobilization of supporters and channeling their enthusiasm and resources into action. Neither will happen without communication; first, in the process of framing the issue so that it generates broad- based public support, and second, in convincing the grassroots to take effective action.
Once the issue is joined, and the troops are at the ready, there must be continuing communication between the " inside" (Washington-based advocates) and the "outside" (the grassroots). People become mobilized when they are first energized, most often when they believe that something important to them is at risk - their environment, their freedom, or their health.
Communication is an ongoing, organic process that, at its best, rewards and regrets the inside advocate at the same time as it educates the grassroots. To be effective, there must be continual feedback and attentive listening. Not only do supporters want to be hear, they want to heard and be consulted. Members should have a stake in the policy goals of the organization. To often the organization is perceived as setting those goals from the "top down," with little or no prior consultation with the grassroots. Communication must continue beyond the initial setting of policy objective, and include the inevitable refinement and modification of short and intermediate term goals as the issue is subjected to public and legislative debate.
Many grassroots organizations send their lobbyists into the field to share their experiences with members, as well as to listen and answer questions. Large organizations have an opportunity to become "real people" in the eyes of their members., and lobbyists get a first hand opportunity to gauge the breadth and depth of grassroots concern on an issue. Still other organizations "connect" their grassroots activists electronically, taking advantage of the latest computer networking technology to connect activists to each other and to Washington-based advocates.
Meetings at the grassroots level can be an important opportunity to educate and involve members about the issue and its legislative status, but the purpose and goals of the meetings should be clear. Large meetings should be informational, no action oriented, and should include a person who is knowledgeable about the issue and can answer a variety of questions. More useful are small meetings with local leadership and activists where in- depth discussions can occur.
Consultation is part of an ongoing process, not just for the Washington-based advocate to make sure he or she is in step with the grassroots, but also to create and maintain the necessary intensity in the grassroots that will support an advocacy campaign. Consultation includes member surveys, focus groups, and polling data. This data is then supplemented by the kinds of public opinion data (described in section III) that are used to help frame an issue.
Advocacy organizations should set achievable goals for their members, providing specific tasks, accompanied by the resources necessary to accomplish them. The tasks can range from writing letters to their elected representatives to arranging meetings with editorial boards. Appropriate feedback helps members become a part of an ongoing campaign.
20/20 Vision operates under the principle that individuals will be willing to spend twenty minutes a month to do something about arms control or the environment. it organized citizens within Congressional districts, who each month decide on a particular task to recommend to the group's Congressional district members. With the help of a knowledgeable Washington staff ( and access to Washington "insiders"), the task chosen may focus on an upcoming legislative vote, be a thank-you note for a past vote, or a suggestion to contact local media for coverage of an issue. Tasks aren't handed down from Washington, only suggestions. And the Washington staff has found that subscribers in Cleveland have a better notion how to localize an arms control issue - and capture the attention of Senator Glenn - than do the Washington insiders.
With routine contact with Washington advocates, local activists see themselves as insiders, and are more able to sustain the intensity required for the necessarily long term struggle inherent in the environmental and arms control movements. Several keys to successfully motivating the grassroots emerge from the 20/20 Vision experience: choose specific, achievable tasks; put limits on what you ask people to do, provide feedback on issues and activities, provide them with access to Washington advocates as a source of information and reinforcement, and provide them with advice on how they can really make a difference.
The block Bork campaign kept in constant tough with grassroots supporters as it developed and implemented strategy.
A Washington-based coordinator was designated to serve as the Washington connection for a group of target state coalition. The assigned "Desks" were to keep information flowing to and form the Field, nurture the local coalitions, and facilitate coordinated planning. Each target state or local coalition was phone at least weekly, sometimes daily, by its "Desk."
That work involved helping the state leadership reach known constituencies, and then helping them broaden and expand their base. Karen Bosch, on organizer hired to work for two months with Arizonans for a Just Supreme Court, confirmed the importance of daily conversations with the desks: "It was motivating and it either would confirm what we were doing or help to bring another perspective to bear on what the local coalition was doing." Each Wednesday at noon, throughout the campaign, this national Grassroots Task Force met to exchange information about activities in the field. This meeting was always enhanced by updates offered by Washington representatives of parent organizations which gathered news directly and frequently from their affiliates in the field.
The national Coalition could draw deeply on the political intelligence gathered by local activists. Texas advocates, for example, had different people getting information from Senator Bertsen's various Texas-based offices, so they could monitor as closely as they could not only where the Senator stood, but what his feelings were about the kind of opposition the campaign was considering to the Bork nomination, including what was more acceptable versus less acceptable to him, as well as how many telephone calls, postcards, and letters were coming in.
The National Abortion Rights Action League circulated to state affiliates its weekly "Bork Beat," which highlighted events around the country. NARAL's Debra Ness says: "This homespun weekly update on grassroots activities not only facilitated the transfer of creative ideas and tactics, but also inspired healthy competition between states as to who could generate the most grassroots action."
Issues must be framed so that they are salient to the grassroots, using basic principles that are important to members.
In 1989, the pro-choice movement found that its supporters were mobilized by the fear that decades of progress on women's and abortion rights were threatened by the Supreme Court's Webster decision and its aftermath, as anti-abortion groups began pressing state legislatures for laws restricting access to abortions. Women and others who had grown accustomed to the settled state of the law had to understand that a new era loomed, in which movement might be backwards. By framing the issue as a potential loss of the freedom of choice, women's organization were able to mobilize - at lease for a time - many women who had become complacent about their rights.
Virtually all organizations encounter times when their members react adversely to the organization's position or to legislative developments. Common Cause found itself in just such a position when it called for a House Ethics Committee Investigation of then- Speaker Wright.
While Common Cause members knew the organization pushed long and hard for ethics reform, many were not prepared for it to take on the Democratic House Speaker in the Presidential election year. Still others were upset because they admired Wright, who had been a key figure trying to bring peace to Central America.
Common Cause tackled the problem directly, using its Chairman (and former Watergate Prosecutor) Archibald Cox, to tell its members - and the public - how carefully the organization had explored the issue, and how this action was consistent with many similar actions in the past. Common Cause used its magazine, the media, and its volunteer network to get the message across.
Common Cause has an "early warning system" in place to give its Washington office the first signal of any problems at the grassroots level. On any given Tuesday, Washington volunteers will be in touch with some 500 members around the country. The connection is quick, just to get a sense of how they respond to materials sent out, and whether they have any suggestions. Questions from the volunteer connection early in 1989 first alerted Common Cause that despite a constant record of support for Congressional pay raises, some of its members were ready to speak out opposing the latest raise. Common Cause addressed the issue head on, supplying its members with material that described the campaign accurately and honestly as one for a reasonable salary adjustment which would be paid for by special interests through honoraria.
"Leadership with listening" best describes the relationship between the organization's leaders and the grassroots. Issue leadership requires the organization's leaders to bring along its constituency, never venturing very far from it, always seeking its approval and reaffirmation of the organization's mandate. It is possible for an organization to "over-listen" to its members, and become paralyzed into inaction, for fear that any action will upset a significant percentage of its membership. In those situations, leaders must lead. Lay Hedlund, Common Cause Field Director, observes:
"You figure the parameters and how far you can go with the bulk of your members, not just the most active or the most committed on certain issues. You try to keep 80% of your membership with you. If members have been educated about the legislative process, part of what they will come to understand is that compromise is inevitable. While they may not be pleased with the final legislative vehicle for a particular issue, as long as they feel the basic principles are in place, chances are they will stick it out. An organization which has been listening to its members may have to reframe an issue, not back off it, in order to re- enlist its members."
John Carr, head of the advocacy arm of the United States Catholic Conference, advises that open, participatory decision-making within advocacy organizations can help ensure that Washington advocates will have the full support of the grassroots.
"When issue leaders put together a position statement - and when we do out job well by involving lots of people - then that policy is much more broadly owned and much more likely to be acted upon, not only nationally, but locally. When we as advocates take the time and trouble - and it is often a painful process - to make policy in close consultation with the grassroots, Congress has more confidence in us."
"When often overlook the internal policymaking process, because it is just not as much fun as the outside activities. The hard internal work involves developing a position; building consensus around that position; finding a way to move an issue within your organization; raising the salience of that issue within the organizational and translating an idea from a piece of paper into a program of action, a strategy. We must encourage diversity; we should insist on hearing both perspectives from the grassroots; and we must make sure our institutional diversity is reflected in the way we work at all levels. Many of us who work for national organizations tend to be more strategic, clearer and more effective, in our external politics than our internal politics. We become vulnerable because we are only as strong as our base."
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